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      Although Hegel considers aspects of the Cartesian philosophy in other works, his 
most extended treatment is in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, a work 
published posthumously from a disparate collection of materials. His History is not the 
neutral, dispassionate work of a scholar, a treatment he would despise as "wandering 
around in mausoleums".1 It is also not without difficulty to understand what informs 
Hegel's presentation of the history, what in this case underlies the extraordinary statement 
of the Cartesian philosophy one reads in the Lectures. In this paper I shall indicate first 
what versions of the Lectures I use, then give a short commentary on Hegel's treatment of 
Descartes. Hegel uses Descartes' Principles of Philosophy as his text, which is 
problematic. In the third section of the paper, I draw out the difficulty of using the 
Principles; then in the fourth section I consider Hegel's treatment more deeply in its 
context, which has as consequence an insight into why he might have used that text.  
 
A. Editions Of Hegel's Lectures On The History Of Philosophy. 
       Hegel lectured on the history of philosophy nine times, in Jena (1805-6) for which he 
produced a written text, twice at Heidelberg (1816-17, 1817-18) using an outline, then six 
times in Berlin (summer 1819, 1820-21, 1823-24, 1825-26, 1827-28, 1829-30) 
supplementing the Jena manuscript and the Heidelberg outline with further notes.2 For the 
two editions of the lectures on the history of philosophy of Karl Ludwig Michelet (in 
Volumes 13-15 of Hegel's Werke, first edition 1833-36, second edition 1840-44) he had 
access to the Jena manuscript and notes in Hegel's own hand, documents which are now 
lost to us, as well as transcripts from students attending lecture series in various years at 
Berlin.3 He produced a fusion of all these materials, not distinguishing between what was 
Hegel's own and what came from other sources. It is generally conceded that Michelet's 
                                                
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. T.M.Knox and 
A.V.Miller, Oxford, 1985, 100. Henceforth, Introd. 
2 Introduction to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, The Lectures of 
1825-26, Vol. III: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R.F. Brown and J.M. 
Stewart, Berkeley, 1990, 1-2. Hereafter, Brown. 
3 Among the large number of extant auditors' transcripts, Michelet mentions only a few as ones he chiefly 
drew upon. See Brown, 3. 
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second edition is inferior to the first4. The standard English translation of E.S.Haldane 
and Frances H. Simson used Michelet's second edition, which is in general more literary 
than the first.5  
       There have been efforts in recent years from collaborators in the work of the Hegel-
Archiv to reproduce the extant texts of Hegel's lectures. These are appearing under the 
general title of Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (Felix Meiner 
Verlag, Hamburg). What are available of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy are 
student transcripts from various series. The editors of these lectures did not feel the 
necessity, as in the new edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to produce 
each series independently because they did not find the transcripts from year to year 
differed substantially from one another. Rather, they present the 1825-26 series because 
of a better stock of materials for reconstructing them  five different manuscripts, among 
them the ample transcript of Captain von Griesham. The new edition of the lectures on 
the history of philosophy, medieval and modern, has been published in German (eds. 
Walter Jaeschke and Pierre Garniron) and in English translation.6 By utilizing only the 
1825-26 lectures, the new edition is not as rich in content as Michelet, especially his first 
edition. There is happily a recent French critical edition of Michelet's first edition, also by 
Pierre Garniron.7 Its critical apparatus identifies those elements which come from 
Griesham (putting them in an italic script within the body of the Michelet text) and 
reductively then those which most likely come from Hegel's own manuscripts.  
       For our purposes there are advantages in consulting all three versions: Brown is a 
presentation of one series of Hegel's lectures on Descartes, where the essence of the 
matter is there most directly and unadorned; for commentary on passages otherwise 
unclear in Brown, Michelet I is most useful since it puts the matter sometimes in other 
words, amplifies and draws into the treatment of the subject additional comments; then 
Michelet II, the work of an excellent student of Hegel, who himself attended the 1823-24 
lectures, presents a comprehensive, fully developed version of the lectures. I shall use 
Brown as the basic text here, supplementing with Michelet I and Michelet II for 
clarification and amplification.  
 
                                                
4 Ibid., "The second edition is quite different and less satisfactory; it is considerably abbreviated, is much 
less useful in its notes and apparatus, and gives a decidedly flat impression because it does not reflect with 
as much authenticity the spirit of Hegel's lectures." 
5 The English translation, Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances 
H. Simson, 3 vols., London and New York, 1892, reprinted 1974. Hereafter Michelet II (Vol.3 unless 
otherwise noted). After Hegel's untimely death in 1831 there was the great desire of his students, among 
them Michelet, to publish Hegel's hitherto unpublished lectures. They were therefore published in some 
haste in that first edition. 
6 In German, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4, Philosophie des Mittelalters und 
der neueren Zeit, ed. Walter Jaeschke and Pierre Garniron, Hamburg, 1986 (hereafter, Jaeschke and 
Garniron; in English, Brown, op.cit. 
7 . G.W.F. Hegel, Leçons sur l'histoire de la Philosophie, Tome 6:La Philosophie Moderne par Pierre 
Garniron. Hereafter, Michelet I. 
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B. Hegel's Treatment Of Descartes In The 1825-26 Lectures On Modern Philosophy 
       Hegel's project in his lectures on the history of modern philosophy is to draw 
together 'subjectivity' and 'substance'. His treatment of Descartes, true to the Cartesian 
philosophy, situates it in that larger history. What is initially striking in the Hegelian 
treatment (found in every version  Brown, p. 140, Michelet I, pp. 1396-1399, Michelet II, 
224 and passim) is the revelation that in Descartes is first found the statement of the unity 
of thought and being, and the movement from that unity in the cogito to the unity of 
thought and being in God expressed in the ontological argument -- God as the principle 
of Cartesian metaphysics8. The movement in Descartes' philosophy is therefore a 
movement from the finite subject to the infinite substance  
       In all three versions now generally available, it is noteworthy that Hegel takes the 
Cartesian philosophy from the Principles of Philosophy, not from Meditations, even 
though references are also given to relevant pages in Meditations.9 This becomes a matter 
of greatest significance in Hegel's presentation of the arguments for God's existence. In 
the Principles the a priori argument appears first [n.14], and the principle "What is clear 
and distinct is true" subsequently [n.30]. In the Meditations, however, the a priori proof 
is a consequent of the principle "What is clear and distinct is true." It might be noted that 
Hegel follows an outline in his treatment of Descartes given in the opening of Part I of 
Spinoza's The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy10. The outline is skeletal only as Hegel 
transforms these moments to (a) a beginning with thought alone; (b) the movement to 
certainty in the cogito argument; (c) the passage from certitude to truth and objectivity in 
the idea of God; (d) the foundation of human understanding in the Divine veracity. There 
is no imposition therefore from the side of Spinoza's outline on Hegel's treatment.11  
                                                
8 Metaphysics is that which marks the transition from the subjective merely to the objective (from certainty 
to truth, the "I" to God): "What comes [next] is thus the transition of this certainty into truth, into the 
determinate; Descartes again makes this transition in a naive way, and with it we for the first time begin to 
consider his metaphysics." Michelet II, 233. 
9 But these references do not appear to be Hegel's own. They are from Michelet himself. See the 
reconstruction in the French edition, which is able to distinguish what is from Hegel's own manuscripts, 
now lost, and what is added by Michelet. Jean-Luc Marion, Questions Cartésiennes II (Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1996) notes the following (p.10, n.11): "...Hegel ne cite jamais, à notre 
connaissance, que les textes suivants: la traduction latine (P/ de Courcelles, Specimina, 1644) du Discours 
de la Méthode,IV, les Principia Philosophiae, I, # 7 et - pris comme un texte de Descartes!  Spinoza, 
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae; les Meditationes semblent entièrement ignorées  fait d'autant plus 
remarquable que Hegel est sans doute l'un des premiers à se préoccuper de lire effectivement les textes de 
ses prédécesseurs. C'est dire le poids de l'interprétation canonique." This is not quite accurate, although 
Marion's point that the Meditations on the face of it seems ignored is well taken. Hegel clearly refers to 
passages in Rep.II Obj. and Rep. V Obj. 
10 Spinoza writes: "In order to proceed with his investigation with the utmost caution Descartes was 
compelled: (1.) To lay aside all prejudice; (2) To find the fundamental truth on which all knowledge rests; 
(3.) To discover the cause of error; (4.) To understand everything clearly and distinctly." 
11 The fourfold division according to the outline is very explicit in Michelet I and Michelet II, and fades 
away in Jaeschke and Garniron (hence also in Brown). 
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       The treatment in Brown is the most economical, as one might expect in the notes of 
very good students. Its very economy is also a great purity. We read this in Griesham's 
transcript:  
We come now for the first time to what is properly the philosophy of the 
modern world, and we begin with Descartes. Here, we may say, we are at 
home and, like the sailor after a long-voyage, we can at last shout "Land 
ho." Descartes made a fresh start in every respect. The thinking or 
philosophizing, the thought and the formation of reason in modern times, 
begins with him. The principle in this new era is thinking , the thinking 
that proceeds from itself. We have exhibited this inwardness above all 
with respect to Christianity; it is preeminently the Protestant principle. The 
universal principle now is to hold fast to inwardness as such, to set dead 
externality and sheer authority aside and to look upon it as something not 
to be allowed. In accordance with this principle of inwardness it is now 
thinking, thinking on its own account, that is the purest pinnacle of this 
inwardness.[Brown, 132]12  
Descartes is described there as the true beginning of modern philosophy, he "began at the 
beginning, from the universal, from thinking as such, and this is a new and absolute 
beginning"[Brown, 137]. It is the "I think" which is the starting point, expressed by 
Descartes in saying we must doubt everything, not as the skeptic who rests in doubt, but 
in order to seek what is certain. The first point is therefore that we must renounce all 
presuppositions, that thinking might proceed not from anything external or foreign to 
itself, but from itself alone: "The demand which rests at the basis of Descartes' reasonings 
thus is that what is recognized as true should be able to maintain the position of having 
the thought therein at home with itself."[Michelet II, 226]  
       Thus, in seeking what is in itself certain and indubitable, Descartes is inexorably led 
to thinking: "What is certain is certainty itself, knowing as such, in its pure form as 
relating itself to itself  this is thinking."[Brown, 139] Then there is the "determination of 
being", cogito ergo sum,  "the determination of being is immediately bound up with the I 
... in it thinking and being are thus inseparably bound together."[Brown, 141] It is not a 
syllogism, for there is no mediation between thinking and being, but rather simple 
identity [Brown, 140] 13; moreover, "thinking" here is, as Descartes answers to Gassendi, 
"consciousness", to which Hegel adds: "If I say 'I see, I go for a walk,' the I is in the 
determination of seeing or of going, but I am in it also as thinking. When I say 'I' that is 
thinking. It is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking in one particular pocket and 
sensation, seeing, wishing and the like in another. Thinking is what is wholly universal. 
Thought represented as what is thinking is the I."[Brown, 140] Thus for Hegel, as also 
                                                
12 Brown, 132. It is remarkable that what are essentially a student's notes could be so vivid. It is reported 
that Hegel lectured slowly. 
13 Brown, 140; cf. Rep.II Obj.,AT vii, 140-41, where Descartes explicitly rejects the thought that the 
connection between thinking and existing involves a syllogism. But in Principles, there is a syllogistic 
argument modus ponens. See n. 21. 
FLOY E ANDREWS: HEGEL'S PRESENTATION OF THE CARTESIAN 
 PHILOSOPHY IN THE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 26 
implicitly for Descartes, the "I" or "self" which is conscious is the universalizing, 
unifying activity -- what in Kant is called the "transcendental ego".14 But, Hegel notes, 
"Descartes offers no proof of this thesis of the unity of thinking and being."[Brown, 141] 
This observation is, while true of the Meditations (which does not proceed as will be 
shown by way of 'proof'), is not on the face of it true respecting the Principles: in that 
work there is a proof, proceeding from the major premise "whatever thinks, at the time 
that it is thinking, exists."15 And Hegel seems to be aware of all the subtleties here:  
From the one side we view this proposition as a syllogism: being is 
deduced from thinking. Against this logical connection Kant objected that 
being is not contained in thinking, that it is distinct from thinking, and he 
is quite correct. They are, however, inseparable, that is, they constitute an 
identity. What is inseparable from another is nonetheless distinct from it, 
although the identity is not endangered by this difference; the two are a 
unity. All the same, this is not a syllogism, for a syllogism comprises three 
terms; needed here is a third term that would mediate between thinking 
and being. But that is not how it is. It is not "I think, therefore I am"  the 
"therefore" is not here the "therefore' of the syllogism, for it expresses 
only the correlation by which being is immediately linked with thinking. 
In Descartes, therefore, we see expressed the identity of being and 
thinking.[Brown, 139-40]  
Hegel cannot state strongly enough the importance of the Cartesian insight: "This [the 
unity of thinking and being] is on the whole the most interesting idea of modern 
philosophy, and Descartes was at any rate the first to formulate it."[Brown, 142]16 
Nevertheless it is here as well that Descartes' philosophy suffers most: its determinate 
conceptions were not deduced from the understanding, but "taken up 
empirically"[Michelet II, 224], simply discovered intuitively. It is this inadequacy which 
Hegel's own Logic will overcome. Nevertheless,  
      "What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into truth, into the 
determinate," for the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof for God's existence. Yet the 
                                                
14 Hegel describes 'consciousness' as the "self-actualizing Universal"; Descartes, it is true, calls the self, 
which he otherwise identifies with consciousness, a "thinking thing", clinging therefore to a substantiality , 
a "thing endowed with a faculty of thought"[Rep.III Obj., AT vii, 174.], which he himself must modify in 
the Principles of Philosophy where he recognizes that in truth only God is properly substance.[Principles, 
n. 52] 
15 Principles I, n.7. See also the Conversation with Burman: "Before this inference, 'I think therefore I am', 
the major 'whatever thinks is' can be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference 
depends on it. This is why the author says in the Principles that the major premise comes first, namely 
because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. But it does not follow that I am always expressly and 
explicitly aware of its priority, or that I know it before my inference..." AT, v, 147; CSMK, 333.  
16 Brown, 142. In Michelet II, 224, he says: "In order to do justice to Descartes' thoughts it is necessary for 
us to be assured of the necessity for his appearance; the spirit of his philosophy is simple knowledge as the 
unity of Thought and Being." 
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transition here is again, in Hegel's words, "[made] in a naive way." Consciousness in 
seeking to extend its knowledge, casts about and simply finds a fund of ideas -- Hegel 
calls them fittingly Vorstellungen  which have nothing deceptive about them so long as it 
does not claim there is something objective and external to itself given in them. Hegel 
reminds us, "I am presenting this in the way Descartes does," for clearly this manner of 
simply finding and not deriving these ideas is inadequate. It is especially in the 
convenient appearance of the idea of God, which Descartes finds ready to hand, so to 
speak, that the inadequacy is most evident. "Hence we see these determinations following 
upon one another in an empirical and naive manner, one that is therefore not 
philosophically or metaphysically demonstrative."[Brown, 143] But this one idea, which 
for Descartes "stands out from all the others..."17 as alone having within itself 'existence', 
and not merely possible or contingent existence "but utterly necessary and eternal 
existence" [Princ. N.14, CSM I; AT viiiA, 10] is, as Hegel describes it, "a 
presupposition. We find within ourselves this idea, one would now say, as the highest, 
that the One is. That is then presupposed; and if we ask whether this idea exists, that is 
precisely what the idea is, that with it existence is posited too."18 Thus Hegel can 
conclude that in this idea of God no other than the same unity expressed in cogito ergo 
sum, the unity of being and thinking, is expressed.  
       Descartes, of course, calls the idea of God which he finds in his thinking an "innate 
idea", that is, an idea which I can think of at will but which has its own determinate 
nature which I can neither add to nor subtract from. Hegel's characterization of the idea of 
God as a "presupposition" in the Cartesian philosophy is an accurate description of the 
manner in which Descartes happens upon it, especially in the Principles: "The mind next 
considers the various ideas which it has within itself, and finds that there is one idea  the 
idea of a supremely intelligent, supremely powerful and supremely prefect being  which 
stands out from all the others..." With more attention to the logic of such a find, the 
Meditations raise the question where do the ideas in his thinking come from, that is, are 
they all founded in his thinking as derived from the cogito itself or found in it? It is in his 
search for an idea not of his creation, not merely subjective, that he inevitably will come 
to the idea of that which cannot come merely from his thinking, pure objectivity, the idea 
of God which he possesses but cannot be thought to have caused. Here too the idea of 
God is a "presupposition", as it turns out, "innate in me just as the idea of myself is innate 
in me", the "mark of the workman imprinted on his work", a mark which is not 
"something different from the work itself." As one scholar has noted, "...it is on my 
nature, not in my mind  that God has imprinted his mark. That is why reflection on the 
self of which I am conscious yields not only the idea of what I am, but the idea of God 
too."19  
                                                
17 Principles, no.14, CSM I; AT viiiA, 10. 
18 "...eine Voraussetzung. Wir finden in uns diese Idee  würden man jetzt sagen  als die höchste, dass das 
Eine ist. Dies is also so vorausgestzt, und wenn wir fragen, ob diese Idee auch existiere, so soll gerade dies 
die Idee sein, dass damit auch die Existenz gesetzt ist." Vorlesungen, Teil 4, 96. Brown's translation was 
somewhat opaque here. 
19 Robert McRae, "Innate Ideas", Cartesian Studies, ed. R.J. Butler, Oxford, 1972, 42. 
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       There is not in the 1825-26 lectures a separation of the a priori proof from the other 
two proofs found in the Principles of Philosophy, from the idea of God present in the 
finite subject. In Descartes these have a definite importance since the a priori proof must 
be supplemented by the second proof of the Principles. He recognizes the certainty of the 
a priori proof while we are in the actual state of contemplating the idea of God, but "at 
times when we are not intent on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, a 
doubt may easily arise as to whether the idea of God is not one of those which we made 
up at will, or at least one of those which do not include existence in their essence." In this 
respect, the a priori proof suffers the same defect as mathematics: we cannot deny that 
two and three added together are five while we are turned to the thing itself, but we lose 
that certitude as soon as we turn away from it.20 There is not properly for Descartes a 
transition to truth, to objectivity in the Principles, at least for the finite subject, simply 
with the a priori proof. When one finds in his thinking an idea of God and attends to it, 
seeing in it necessary and eternal existence, then the mind must conclude that God exists. 
This is sufficient for certainty, the state of the attentive mind, but not for truth, the 
assurance that what the attentive mind turns away from does not disappear or change, the 
confidence that the clear and distinct is constant, objective, true. "Hence at times when 
we are not intent on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, a doubt may easily 
arise as to whether the idea of God is not one of those made up at will, or at least one of 
those which do not include existence in their essence."[Princ., n.16, AT viiiA, 11; CSM I, 
198] It is for this reason that the a priori proof in the Principles must be supplemented by 
the proofs from "effects". A finite discursive mind turns from one idea to another, cannot 
hold fast to all its ideas at once. Thus Descartes asks first what is the cause of the idea of 
God within us, and then as supplement to that question, what is the source of our being, 
we who have always had the idea of a being more perfect than ourselves.21  
       The causal proofs from the "idea of God" in the finite subject is given in Michelet I 
and Michelet II after the a priori proof, as in the Principles. There is thus the separation 
of the proofs, and consequently an implicit consciousness of their role in completing the 
movement from certainty to truth as it is found in the Cartesian philosophy. But the 
importance of the proofs from the idea of God as 'effect' is not drawn out in any of the 
versions of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy presently available to us. This is 
remarkable because Descartes shows the logic of the movement from one to the others 
very plainly in the Principles. It is all the more remarkable when one grants that it is to 
Hegel himself that we owe the explicit statement of the movement from certainty to truth 
                                                
20 As in Meditation III: "And whenever my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes to 
mind, I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong 
even in those matters which seemed most evident...Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I 
perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so 
deceive me, he will never bring it about that ...two or three added together are more or less than five, or 
anything in which I see a manifest contradiction." AT vii, 36; CSM II, 25. 
21 It is evident by the natural light, he says, that something which recognizes something more perfect than 
itself is not the cause of its own being. Principles I, n.20, AT viiiA, 12; CSM 200. 
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in the Cartesian philosophy, a matter of the greatest importance in the interpretation of 
Descartes.22  
       The fourth division of Hegel's treatment, which will discuss the implication that the 
divine veracity has for us, begins oddly with this quote, in part paraphrased, from 
Descartes: "We must believe what is revealed to us by God, although we do not directly 
conceive it. We must not be surprised that it surpasses our capability." Michelet II adds 
"It is not to be wondered at, since we are finite, that there is in God's nature as 
inconceivably infinite, what surpasses our comprehension."[238] These reflections are 
found in Principles, nn.24-26, and they precede Descartes' discussion there of the divine 
veracity and its consequence for us that "what is clear and distinct is true." Descartes says 
there that in order to pass from knowledge of God to knowledge of creatures, we must try 
to deduce from our knowledge of God an explanation of the things He has created,23 
bearing in mind as a precaution that God, the creator of all things, is infinite while we are 
altogether finite. On this basis, he will not in his science search for 'final causes', nor will 
he enter into arguments about the 'real infinite' (God) which he distinguishes from the 
'indefinite', things in which we observe no limit. Hegel sets the proof of the fundamental 
principle of the understanding in its very proper context, for only after Descartes has 
entered into the metaphysics of the identity of thought and being, having shown that there 
is for finite thinking this identity and has drawn it into relation to the identity of thought 
and being in our idea of God, indeed in God himself, does he move to what is other than 
his thinking.  
       Although Descartes seems to retreat from metaphysics (at least in the Principles), 
admonishing us to leave those lofty ideas for the finite subjective cognition of the finite 
world, this turn to the finite is, as is clear in the structure of the Meditations, in 
thoroughgoing relation to the idea of God: "What is asserted here then is that through 
thinking we experience how things are in fact; God's truthfulness is made into the 
absolute bond between subjective cognition and the actuality of what is thus 
known."[Brown, 144]24 Hegel continues:  
We have here the antithesis between subjective cognition and actuality. At 
one moment we are told the two are inseparably linked, that thinking is 
being. The next moment they are regarded as different, so that the need to 
mediate them arises, and the proof of their unity rests on the mediating. 
Set forth here on the one side is our subjective cognition, and on the other 
side actuality. What mediates them is the truthfulness of God or the truth 
                                                
22 A failure to make the distinction is the source of the charges of 'circularity', for example. 
23 In Part Two he will deduce, for example, the three primary laws of motion from God's immutability. 
24 Brown, 144. This understanding is directly opposed to those who would characterize Descartes' 
metaphysics as "a drape to cover the goods" [Charles Adams in AT xii, 306], "subterfuge" [Stephen 
Gaukroger, Descartes, an Intellectual Biography, Oxford, 1995, 12], "double-talk" [Hiram Caton, The 
Origin of Subjectivity: an Essay on Descartes, New Haven, 1973, chaps. 1 and 4] or "dissimulation" [Louis 
Loeb's thesis in several articles], that is, as having no relationship to his scientific philosophy. 
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of God. This truth itself is in its turn none other than the fact that the idea 
of God immediately contains actuality within itself as well.[Brown, 144]  
The veracity of God is precisely the unity of thought and being[Michelet I, 1418], "this 
unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived, and external reality or 
existence."[Michelet II, 239] Hegel criticizes Descartes for not deriving 'extension' from 
'thought': "Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has not the 
conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness: but simple Being, set forth as 
the negative of self-consciousness, is extension." [Michelet II, 241] Descartes does 
however know 'extension' as the 'other' of thought  'thinking' for Descartes is absolutely 
what 'extension' is not. "Thought, concept, or what is spiritual, thinking and self-
conscious, is what returns into itself, what is at home with itself. The opposite to thought 
is what is not at home with itself  what has being outside itself, what is extended, what is 
not free... the entire sphere of extended substance (the kingdom of nature), or that of 
spiritual substance, constitutes a totality within itself. Each of the two, the entirety of 
each aspect, can be grasped without the other."[Brown, 146] But Descartes knows also 
the perfect reciprocity of 'thinking' and 'extension', for `thinking' has faculties of 
sensation and imagination which are directed wholly to extended substance; and 
`extension' has properties, number and measure, which are wholly appropriate to 
'thinking'.25 What is wanting is the logic of this difference and relation, for without that 
Cartesianism seems to be caught in the dualism which subsequently is unfairly attributed 
to Descartes himself.  
       Hegel observes the manner in which Descartes accounts for the interactions of the 
spiritual cogito and body: "But the middle term or the link between the abstract universal 
and the particular external [body] has to be identified. Descartes identifies it by saying 
that God is the intermediary, the middle term. This is what is called the system of 
assistance, namely that God is the metaphysical ground of the reciprocal 
changes..."[Brown, 151] This account is anticipated, moreover, in Descartes' 
acknowledgement of the divine veracity as guarantee of clear and distinct ideas:  
...we saw that Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of the 
conception: as long as I think rightly and consistently, something real 
corresponds to my thought, and the connecting link is God. God is hereby 
the perfect identity of the two opposites, since He is, as Idea, the unity of 
Notion [Begriff: 'concept'] and reality...Descartes' conclusion is quite 
correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect. Only the form employed 
by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the beginning there are 
two things, thought or soul and body, and that then God appears as a third 
thing, outside both  that He is not the Notion of unity, nor are the two 
elements themselves Notion.[Michelet II, 251-2]  
                                                
25 See Meditation 6 for Descartes' appreciation of this absolute difference of 'thinking' and `extension', and 
also their complete relation to each other. 
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       To pass from metaphysics to physics, to a world of particular bodies, we must move 
from matter simply as extension to matter-in-motion. Hegel writes aptly: "One of 
Descartes' main points is that matter, extension, corporeality, are quite the same thing for 
thought; according to him the nature of body is fulfilled in its extension, and this should 
be accepted as the only essential fact respecting the corporeal world."[Michelet II, 245] 
But Descartes does not himself leave the matter there. To move to a world system he 
must hypothesize motion externally given to matter, in such a way to be sure that 
preserves the essential characteristic of body as `extension', which Hegel acknowledges 
elsewhere: "Extension and motion are the fundamental conceptions in mechanical 
physics; they represent the truth of the corporeal world. ... Hence changes in matter are 
due merely to motion, so that Descartes traces every relationship to rest and movement of 
particles, and all material diversity such as colour, and taste  in short, all bodily qualities 
and animal phenomena  to mechanism."[Michelet II, 247]  
 
C. The Difference Of Presentation Of The Cartesian Philosophy In Meditations And 
In The Principles. 
       As has been noted already, Hegel used in his exposition Descartes' Principles of 
Philosophy rather than the Meditations. On the face of it, this is both puzzling and 
problematic: puzzling because the Meditations is the work generally regarded as the 
canonical Cartesian text26 and problematic because the order of presentation in the 
Principles cannot be regarded as proceeding with the same indubitability as the 
Meditations. Descartes makes it clear in his Conversation with Burman that for the order 
of discovery (hence 'indubitability'), one must look to the Meditations, not to the 
Principles.27 But it is Descartes himself who produced his philosophy , if not more 
geometrico as in Spinoza's Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy, still in 'synthetic' 
rather than 'analytic' form. We might ask why he did this.  
       Descartes knew that his Meditations would pose difficulties for some. When the 
work was first released he wrote to his Jesuit friend: "One problem none the less remains, 
which is that I cannot ensure that those of every level of intelligence will be capable of 
understanding the proofs, or even that they will take the trouble to read them attentively 
                                                
26 It is true that some would dispute this appraisal of the Meditations. But its unique place in the Cartesian 
corpus, engaged as it is in the solution to the problems which plague Descartes' earlier works, and 
establishing the foundation for the structure and limits of human understanding in such a way that all 
subsequent work come from it as the tree from its roots, is the subject of my earlier paper in this journal, 
"God, the Evil Genius and Eternal Truths", Animus, Vol. 3 (1998), 
[http://www.mun.ca/animus/1998vol3/andrews3.htm]. 
27 He says this to Burman: "In the Meditations that argument [the a priori proof of God's existence] comes 
later than the one here [the argument from an effect of God in the Third Meditation]; the fact that it comes 
later, while the proof in this Meditation comes first, is the result of the order in which the author discovered 
the two proofs. In the Principles, however, he reverses the order; for the method and order of discovery is 
one thing, and that of exposition another. In the Principles his purpose is exposition, and his procedure is 
synthetic." 
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..."[11 Nov. 1640, AT iii, 237;CSMK III, 158] By the end of the year of publication of 
the Meditations he was already planning to publish his philosophy in an easier, more 
available form.28 The result would be the Principles of Philosophy, published in 1644, in 
four books29. It is a systematic exposition of Descartes' metaphysics and his natural 
philosophy. He described its contents in the preface to the French edition, and there 
recommended, for a 'sound understanding' of his metaphysics that it would be appropriate 
to read first of all the Meditations.30  
       But after the publication of the Principles, Descartes seemed to have recommended it 
as the preferred entry into his philosophy. Burman records him as expressing such a 
view:  
"A point to note is that one should not devote so much effort to the 
Meditations and to metaphysical questions, or give them elaborate 
treatment in commentaries and the like. Still less should one do what some 
try to do, and dig more deeply into these questions than the author did; he 
has dealt with them quite deeply enough. It is sufficient to have grasped 
them once in a general way, and then to remember the conclusion. 
Otherwise, they draw the mind too far away from physical and observable 
things, and make it unfit to study them. Yet it is just these physical studies 
that it is most desirable for people to pursue, since they would yield 
abundant benefits for life. The author did follow up metaphysical 
questions fairly thoroughly in the Meditations, and established their 
certainty against the skeptics, and so on; so everyone does not have to 
tackle the job for himself, or need to spend time and trouble meditating on 
these things. It is sufficient to know the first book of the Principles, since 
this includes those parts of metaphysics which need to be known for 
physics, and so forth." [CB, 165; CSMK, 346-7].  
Moreover, Descartes cautioned Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden and Descartes' 
intermediary with Queen Christina, not to give his Meditations to the queen: "I will 
merely observe at this point two or three things which experience has taught me about the 
Principles. The first is that though the first part is only an abridgement of what I wrote in 
my Meditations, there is no need to take time off to read my Meditations in order to 
                                                
28 To Mersenne, 31 Dec. 1640: "I will not fail to answer immediately anything you send me about my 
Metaphysics. But otherwise I should be very glad to have as few distractions as possible, for the coming 
year at least, since I have resolved to spend it in writing my philosophy in an order which will make it easy 
to teach." AT iii, 276; CSMK 167. 
29 He had originally proposed a work in six parts, but omitted the treatment of the human body and of the 
passions since the work was already quite lengthy. The latter two topics appear in subsequent works, the 
unfinished La Description du corps humain , written in 1647/8 (a reworking of L'homme , the unpublished 
manuscript of 1633), and Les Passions de l'âme (1649). 
30 "I divided the book into four parts. The first contains the principles of knowledge, i.e. what may be called 
'first philosophy' or 'metaphysics'; so in order to gain a sound understanding of this part it is appropriate to 
read first of all the Meditations which I wrote on the same subject. The other three parts contain all that is 
most general in physics .." AT ixB, 16; CSM I, 187. 
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understand them; many people find the Meditations much more difficult, and I would be 
afraid that Her Majesty might become bored."[26 Feb. 1649, AT v, 291; CSMK, 369]31  
       Since Descartes himself encouraged his readers to take his philosophy from the 
Principles, what objection could possibly be raised if Hegel used it as his text for the 
exposition of the Cartesian philosophy? It is because the order of presentation in the 
Meditations is properly the only compelling order from the subjective beginning, for it 
proceeds from the most extreme doubt "so that absolutely nothing is accepted unless it 
has been so clearly and distinctly perceived that we cannot but assent to it."[Rep.II Obj. 
AT vii, 158; CSM II, 158] A whole literature of Cartesian scholarship, centred on Martial 
Gueroult's Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons (1952), demands that the unity of 
Descartes' thought and the rigorous order of his arguments be paramount in any 
commentary on him. Descartes made this same demand in the Preface to Meditations:  
...I do not expect any popular approval, or indeed any wide audience. On 
the contrary I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who 
are able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their 
minds from the senses and from all preconceived opinions. Such readers, 
as I well know, are few and far between. Those who do not bother to grasp 
the proper order of my arguments and the connection between them, but 
merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion, will not get 
much benefit from reading this book.[AT vii, 9-10; CSM II, 8; italics 
mine.]  
Descartes does not follow what he calls the "order of topics", as so many of his 
commentators do32, but rather the "order of reasons": "It should be noted that throughout 
the work I do not follow the order of topics, but the order of reasons, that is to say that I 
do not attempt to say in a single place everything that pertains to the topic, because it 
would be impossible for me to properly prove them, there being reasons which must be 
drawn from sources farther off than others...The order of topics is only suitable for those 
                                                
31 To Chanut, 26 February 1649, AT v, 291; CSMK, 369. In the dedication of Principles to Princess 
Elizabeth, he finds an altogether different spirit than he presumed in Christina. To Elizabeth he writes: "I 
have even greater evidence of your powers  and this is special to myself  in the fact that you are the only 
person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previously published works. Many other 
people, even those of the utmost acumen and learning, find them very obscure; and it generally happens 
with almost everyone else that if they are accomplished in Metaphysics they hate Geometry, while if they 
have mastered Geometry they do not grasp what I have written on First Philosophy. Your intellect is, to my 
knowledge, unique in finding everything equally clear; and this is why my use of the term 'incomparable' is 
quite deserved." He adds: "And when I consider that such a varied and complete knowledge of all things is 
to be found not in some aged pedant who has spent many years in contemplation but in a young princess 
whose beauty and youth call to mind one of the Graces rather than gray-eyed Minerva or any of the Muses, 
then I cannot but be lost in admiration." 
32 We need only think of the numerous ahistorical commentaries in the analytic tradition, or the more 
ostensibly sympathetic but nonetheless unCartesian books and articles on God in Descartes, freedom in 
Descartes, doubt, clearness and distinctness, etc., where the treatment does not situate the topic in the 
architectonic of the whole but takes it up in isolation from that whole. 
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whose reasons are all unconnected and who can say as much about one difficulty as 
another."[To Mersenne, 24 Dec. 1640, AT iii, 266-7; CSMK III, 163]  
       But these observations are as true for the Principles as for the Meditations: both 
works follow the "order of reasons", both claim to put first what must be known entirely 
without the aid of what comes later, arranging matters "in such a way that their 
demonstration depends solely on what has gone before." [Rep. II Obj., AT vii, 155; CSM 
II, 110] The two works do not, however, proceed in the same way. Descartes 
distinguishes two sorts of order, the analytic order and the synthetic, and situates 
elements of his philosophy in different places according to the whether the order of the 
work is analytic or synthetic. The Meditations proceed by way of "analysis", the 
Principles and the treatment more geometrico in Rep. II Obj. by "synthesis". In the 
former the a priori argument for God's existence is subsequent to the proof from effects 
and has as its premise "What is clear and distinct is true", whereas in the latter works the 
a priori proof is first and the principle of the understanding, "What is clear and distinct is 
true" is derived from the subsequent knowledge we have of God known to exist. These 
two orders coincide in an important way with the distinction drawn in Aristotle and the 
Scholastics between two ways in which things might be said to be known: secundum se 
and quoad nos. In considering whether God's existence is self-evident (per se nota), to 
use a pertinent example, St. Thomas distinguishes what is in itself most knowable from 
what is most knowable to us.33 As Aristotle observes: "For as the eyes of bats are to the 
blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of 
all."34 Analysis proceeds from what is more knowable quoad nos.  
       Which order is to be preferred in metaphysics? Descartes answers: "Now it is 
analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this method alone 
which I employed in my Meditations. As for synthesis...it is a method which it may be 
very suitable to deploy in geometry as a follow-up to analysis, but it cannot so 
conveniently be applied to these metaphysical subjects." [Rep. II Obj. AT vii, 156; CSM 
II, 111] The reason is this:  
... the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of 
geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with 
the use of our senses. Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the 
proper deduction of the consequences, which can be done even by the less 
attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. ... In 
metaphysics by contrast there is nothing which causes so much effort as 
making our perception of the primary notions clear and distinct. 
Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or even more evident 
                                                
33 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. I, q. 2, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se 
notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos." 
34 Metaphysics , 993b10-11. Cf. Summa Theol. I, q.1, a.5 ad 1: "...nihil prohibet id quod est certius 
secundum naturam, esse quoad nos minus certum, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, qui se habet ad 
manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis, sicut dicitur in II Metaphys." 
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than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict 
with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have 
got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who 
really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal 
things, so far as is possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them.[Ibid.]  
The synthetic method, even in geometry, depends on the analytic as the 'method of 
discovery". Its value lies in presenting things in such a way that one might have a 
comprehensive grasp of the whole. But in geometry, and a fortiori in metaphysics, the 
synthetic presentation depends on the analytic discovery: "Analysis shows the true way 
by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a 
priori, so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, 
he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered 
it for himself."[Ibid., 155, 110] If in geometry it does not much matter whether the 
student give such attention, the primary notions according with our ordinary experience, 
in metaphysics this does matter. The Principles of Philosophy therefore are wholly 
dependent on the Meditations for the "deep justifications" (in Gueroult's words) of its 
arguments, ordered according to the requirements of our certainty, and that is why in the 
Preface to the Principles Descartes referred the reader to the Meditations as the proper 
preparation and justification for what is given in the Principles.  
       It is in the Meditations that Descartes gives the proper entry into his philosophy, that 
work alone giving authority, the authority of finite thinking, to the whole Cartesian body 
of work which precedes and follows it. Gueroult writes: "The Meditations is constantly 
invoked by Descartes, now as a breviary, now as the necessary and truly demonstrative 
introduction to the whole of his philosophy. It is to it that the first part of the Principles 
expressly refers; it is on it that he comments to the end of his life, without ever changing 
anything in it."35 The differences between the two works, not so much in content 
(although that too must be noted) as in order and detail, are substantial. We have already 
noted that in the one the cogito argument is not syllogistic, in the other it is; the one 
places the causal arguments for God's existence first, the other the a priori argument; key 
concepts such as "clear and distinct ideas" are simply introduced by way of example or 
exemplars in the Meditations, whereas in the Principles there are definitions (of "clear 
and distinct', "substance", "mode", "attribute" etc.), premises and proofs stated simply, all 
of which follow from its intended use. Finally, we must mention that the Meditations are 
written in the first person singular  the sure sign of the subjective standpoint from which 
it will move to objectivity; the Principles appear in an objective form, written 
impersonally at times or from the standpoint point of all of us: "our doubt", "our mind", 
                                                
35 Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons, 2 vols., Paris, 1952, trans. Roger Ariew, Descartes 
According to the Order of Reasons, 2 vols., Minneapolis, 1984, Vol. I, 8. 
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"we have within us", even "we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are having such 
thoughts, are nothing."  
       Descartes describes the work himself: "... I must tell you that I have resolved to write 
[the principles of my philosophy] before leaving this country, and to publish them 
perhaps within a year. My plan is to write a series of theses which will constitute a 
complete textbook of my philosophy. I will not waste any words, but simply put down all 
my conclusions together with the true premises from which I derive them. I think I could 
do this without many words. ..."[AT iii, 233-4; CSMK 156-7] It would differ from the 
Meditations in these ways: "The first part, which I am working on at present, contains 
almost the same things as the Meditations which you have, except that it is in an entirely 
different style, and what is written at length in one is abbreviated in the other and vice 
versa ..."[AT iii, 276; CSMK 167] This textbook, intended for use in the schools, would 
contain his entire scientific philosophy, the first part serving as the basis of the whole but 
not intended to stand on its own. The Meditations were written in the manner in which 
metaphysical truths are discovered; the same matters treated in the Principles are 
presented as the fruits of that discovery, in tight arguments from premises to conclusions, 
as a recapitulation and presentation of work thought out beforehand. If we are to think 
Cartesian metaphysics, to be drawn into it and convinced by it, we must turn to the 
Meditations; if we are interested simply in Cartesian doctrine, the Cartesian position on 
the matters he treats, whether as foundation for the physics he propounds or simply for 
itself, then the Principles is the appropriate text.  
 
D. Descartes' Place In The History Of Philosophy 
i. The double method: logic and the history of philosophy  
       In the various 'Introductions' to Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he 
makes plain why philosophy is its history, why philosophy which is "the thought which 
brings itself into consciousness, is preoccupied with itself, makes itself its object, thinks 
itself, and at that, in its specific steps and stages" is identical with the process of its self-
development both logically and temporally.  
...the progression of the various stages in the advance of Thought may 
occur with the consciousness of necessity, in which case each in 
succession deduces itself, and this form and this determination can alone 
emerge. Or else it may come about without this consciousness as does a 
natural and apparently accidental process, so that while inwardly, indeed, 
the Notion brings about its result consistently, this consistency is not made 
manifest. ...The one kind of progression which represents the deduction of 
the forms, the necessity thought out and recognized, of the determinations, 
is the business of Philosophy; and because it is the pure Idea which is in 
question and not yet its particularized form as Nature and as Mind, that 
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representation is, in the main, the business of logical Philosophy. But the 
other method, which represents the part played by the history of 
Philosophy, shows the different stages and moments in development in 
time, in manner of occurrence, in particular places, in particular people or 
political circumstances...in short it shows us the empirical form...[Michelet 
II, Vol. I, 29-30]  
This self-development of thought, worked out in Hegel's Science of Logic, is conceived 
by him to have made its appearance temporally, the history of philosophy thus a system 
of development also. But this double development is not to be understood as simply 
logical on the one hand and historical on the other. It is rather that there could be no 
Logic had there not been the historical development, and yet the ultimate measure of 
what belongs to that history is the Science of Logic. 36 
       Since the history of philosophy is not simply a succession of events, an "aggregation 
of facts ordered in some way or other" but a "development of thought, a development 
which is absolutely necessary" [Introd., 88], it is therefore a selection of philosophers, a 
self-selection as it were: "As a history of nations recognizes only the deeds of its heroes, 
so too in the history of philosophy it recognizes only the deeds of thinking reason." 
[Introd. 92]37  
"...even if the history of philosophy has to relate deeds, nevertheless the 
first question is what is a deed in philosophy, i.e. whether something is 
philosophical or not, and what place each deed occupies? ... In the history 
of the outside world everything is a deed (of course some deeds are 
important and others unimportant), but the deed is placed directly before 
our minds, it is a fact. In philosophy the opposite is the case: What a deed 
is and what place is to be ascribed to it, that is the question."[Introd. 190]  
The principle by which a "philosophical deed" can be recognized is that it takes its place 
in the unfolding of philosophy itself. It is for this reason that the system is the measure. 
"The series of their deeds is indeed a series, but it is only one work which has been 
produced. The history of philosophy deals with only one philosophy, one action, though 
one divided into different stages. Consequently, from time immemorial there has been 
only one philosophy, the self-knowledge of the spirit." [Introd., 92]  
       For Descartes, the Cartesian philosophy is a culmination, not an event in the history 
of philosophy. He could not know his place in the long history of philosophy except as its 
                                                
36 "If the Phenomenology of Spirit ... can be looked on as Hegel's introduction to his Logic, so too can the 
History of Philosophy be considered a different sort of introduction to the same Logic  not exhibiting the 
development of consciousness to the point where pure speculative thinking can begin but presenting an 
historical account of the development of speculative thinking itself." Quentin Lauer, "Hegel as Historian of 
Philosophy" in Hegel and the History of Philosophy, ed. Joseph J. O'Malley et al., the Hague, 1974, 22. 
37 Introd., 92. The deeds of the history of philosophy are the works of the philosophers themselves. [Introd. 
184]. 
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completion.38 But for Hegel, the Cartesian philosophy is a moment in that history. How it 
is treated, what is emphasized, what omitted, is determined by that history, and its 
relation to the present:  
"...we do not have to do with the past, but with thinking, with our own 
proper spirit. There is therefore no proper history or it is a history which at 
the same time is no history for the thoughts, principles, ideas which we 
have before us are something present." [p. 133]  
It follows that only in so far as the thought of our predecessors remains integral to our 
thought is it historical. Otherwise it is simply past and dead. Precisely as in the past but 
continuing to be part of the philosophy of the present, the Cartesian philosophy is a 
moment in the history of philosophy. What a particular philosopher thought of his own 
work, its importance and significance for philosophy as he understood it is therefore of 
secondary importance. Descartes is in the history because he is integral to our own 
philosophical thinking.  
       This is not merely, nor primarily, because philosophies contradict one another, 
subsequent philosophies refuting past philosophy (as Descartes might have thought 
himself to have refuted the Scholastic philosophy). In truth "no philosophy has been 
refuted and yet all of them have been."[Introd.95]. What has been refuted is that some 
particular form of philosophy should count itself as "highest now and for all time" when 
what is true is that it has been the highest form in its time, but now has ceased to be, 
given that the activity of spirit is self-developing in that history. If it is no longer regarded 
as the highest philosophy, still its content has not been lost. "Refutation is only setting 
aside one determination of it and making it a subordinate one. No philosophical principle 
has been lost; all such principles are retained in what follows...Refutation of this kind 
occurs in every development, e.g. the growth of a tree from its seed...The latest, the most 
modern, philosophy must therefore contain in itself the principles of all the previous 
philosophies and consequently it is the highest one."[Introd.95] What the Hegelian 
system makes of the Cartesian philosophy is therefore more significant than what 
Descartes made of it himself.  
ii. Descartes' place historically and logically  
       In the groanings of the World-spirit to come into full possession of itself in the long 
course of the history of philosophy, it is the work of modern times, Hegel notes at the end 
of his history, "to grasp this idea as spirit, as the Idea that knows itself." He situates 
Descartes at the beginning of this period where "in order to proceed from the conscious 
Idea to the self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely the fact that the 
Idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely sundered in twain." [Michelet II, 
                                                
38 Hegel observes the same about about all philosophical positions: "It certainly happens that a new 
philosophy makes its appearance which maintains the others to be valueless; and indeed each one in turn 
comes forth at first with the pretext that by its means all previous philosophies not only are refuted, but 
what in them is wanting is supplied, and now at length the right one is discovered." Michelet II, 17. 
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549] With Descartes, he says, "pure thinking rose above this cleavage that had to become 
self-conscious, and progressed to the antithesis of the subjective and the 
objective."[Brown, 272] Descartes cannot fully resolve this antithesis. His place in the 
history of philosophy is fixed: "Self-consciousness, in the first place, thinks of itself as 
consciousness; therein is contained all objective reality, and the positive, intuitive 
reference of its reality to the other side."[Michelet II, 549]  
       As we read again Hegel's treatment of Descartes, it is clear that the principle of the 
Cartesian philosophy, thinking, is wholly absorbed with itself, allows of no 
presupposition or something other than thinking, and this in the name of its freedom: 
"Thinking is to be the point of departure; it is the interest of freedom that is the 
foundation." [Brown, 139] Thought thinking itself, Spirit taking possession of itself, 
becoming what it is, has its proper beginning in this philosophy.  
...the spirit achieves this aim and gains freedom in no other element but 
thought. In perception I have always an other as object, which remains 
other; there are objects which dominate me. So too in feeling I find myself 
dominated, I am not free in it; I am just a victim of it, I have not made 
myself feel. And even if I am conscious of this feeling, I still only know 
that I am feeling something and am compelled to feel it. Even in willing I 
am not simply at home with myself; I have specific interest, and these are 
indeed mine, but they always involve an other over against me, an other 
which remains other and by which I am determined in a natural way, (e.g. 
by impulses, inclinations, etc.) In all these, I am never completely at home 
with myself. Thinking alone is the sphere where everything foreign has 
vanished and the spirit is absolutely free, at home with itself. [Introd., 80]  
Hegel repeatedly observes that Descartes presents his philosophy in an inadequate way. 
Here too: "In the Cartesian form the stress is not on the principle of freedom as such, but 
instead on reasons more popular in tone, namely that we must make no presuppositions 
because it is possible to be mistaken." [Brown, 139]  
       Thinking, as the wholly universal, absorbs 'being' within itself: "Thinking is 
movement within self, pure reference to self, pure identity with self. This is being too." 
[Brown, 141] But, Hegel observes, this identity of Thought and Being , constituting the 
most interesting idea of modern times, is not worked out by Descartes, as it is in the 
Encyclopedia Logic, for example.['Preliminary Conception', nos. 20 - 24] . "He has relied 
on consciousness alone..." [Michelet II, 230]. In asserting that thought is more certain 
than body, what Descartes says more universally is this: "In this Philosophy has regained 
its own ground that thought starts from thought as what is certain in itself, and not from 
something external, not from something given, not from an authority, but directly from 
the freedom that is contained in the 'I think'." [Michelet II, 232]. Again Hegel notes the 
inadequacy: "Descartes offered no proof of this thesis of the unity of thinking and 
being..."[Brown, 141]  
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       In the movement to God, Hegel has said that Descartes "presupposes" the idea of 
God: "Hence we see these determinations following upon one another in an empirical and 
naive manner, one that is therefore not philosophically or metaphysically demonstrative." 
[Brown, 143] It is clear now by what measure these inadequacies are discovered  it is the 
Logic. What Descartes presupposes here, for example, is self-realized in that work, God, 
the Absolute Idea, as the unity of Subjectivity and Objectivity , "having no other content 
than the whole system of which we have so far been studying the development." 
[Encyclopedia Logic, n.237] The Absolute Idea has been there from the beginning. "In 
this perspective, the absolute Idea is to be compared with the old man who utters the 
same religious statements as the child, but for whom they carry the significance of his 
whole life." [Encyclopedia Logic, n.237 Add.]  
       One could go on, but it is now sufficiently manifest that Hegel's treatment of 
Descartes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy has concretely as its paradigm the 
self-development of the Idea in the Logic. What simply appears in Descartes or is 
"innate", presupposed, asserted, is inadequate to the full self-determination of the 
absolute Idea. Yet it is a moment in that life of God in himself "The eternal life of God is 
to find himself, become aware of himself, coincide with himself. In this ascent there is an 
alienation, a disunion, but it is the nature of the spirit, of the Idea, to alienate itself in 
order to find itself again." [Introd., 79-80]  
iii. Hegel's use of Descartes' principles of philosophy  
       The whole presentation of the history of philosophy in the Lectures is orchestrated, 
determined and self-actualized by the self-same movement of thought to come into its 
own as appears in the Logic, "the revelation of God as he knows himself to be" [Michelet 
II, 547]. The determination, we have seen, is entirely self-determination, but it is 
nonetheless necessary.  
I maintain that the succession of philosophical systems in history is the 
same as their succession in the logical derivation of the categories of the 
Idea. I maintain that if the fundamental concepts appearing in the history 
of philosophy are treated purely as what they are in themselves, discarding 
what affects their external form, their application to particular 
circumstances etc., then we have before us the different stages in the 
determination of the Idea itself in their logical order and essence. 
Conversely, if we take the logical process by itself, then we have in its 
chief stages the progress of the historical facts; ... [Introd., 22]  
The course of the history of philosophy presented in the Lectures is therefore objective. It 
is not "the narration of all sorts of opinions", nor of so many philosophical systems in 
opposition to one another; it is not Hegel's history as over against Cousin's. Hegel could 
be mistaken in his interpretation of this or that position, and the history of philosophy 
itself untouched, for it is the disclosure of the self-development of Spirit in time. [Introd., 
87-88].  
FLOY E ANDREWS: HEGEL'S PRESENTATION OF THE CARTESIAN 
 PHILOSOPHY IN THE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 41 
       Descartes' philosophy in that history is presented objectively. The elements of his 
philosophy bring themselves forward: doubt, the cogito, the movement to objectivity in 
the idea of God, God's truthfulness as the absolute bond between subjective cognition and 
objective truth. If Descartes has presented these elements "naively" this is not a criticism 
but a clear indication of his place in the history of philosophy. In a letter to V. Cousin 
who had made a gift to Hegel of his eleven volume edition of Descartes, Hegel writes: 
"Your complete edition of Descartes, which you have given me, is a beautiful present. 
The naïveté of his procedure and exposition is admirable. One can regret not being given 
the power to force men to be introduced to philosophy by studying these treatises, at once 
so simple and clear."39 But objectivity demands that Hegel situate them in the inexorable 
development of the history.  
       In the matter of the argument for the existence of God from the "idea of God " Hegel 
treats it as wholly an ontological argument. Descartes required that the a priori argument 
be bolstered by the argument from causality, because we cannot know whether the idea 
of God and what it implies is trustworthy until we know that what is clear and distinct is 
true. This is as true of his procedure in Principles as in Meditations. In presenting the a 
priori argument Hegel says: "This had already been said by Anselm, that 'God is what is 
most perfect'. The question then arises 'But does this most perfect being also exist?' This 
is an illegitimate question." Hegel's correction of Descartes is equally a correction of 
Kant in this matter. "For what is most perfect is supposed to be that in whose concept 
existence already lies. That is the definition of 'what is most perfect'  existence and 
representation are bound up together in it." [Brown, 142] It is therefore a 
"presupposition" at this juncture in philosophy, this idea of God which from the side of 
logic has not produced itself from itself.  
       Why should Hegel take his presentation of the Cartesian philosophy from the 
Principles and not from the Meditations? In part, one could say it does not matter 
because the elements of his philosophy are present in both works. What is at stake though 
is the authority of the philosophy. Descartes proceeds subjectively in the Meditations, and 
moving solely from the certainty of the cogito and its ideas, finds his way indubitably to 
God and truth, and from there to a "science of nature". The procedure in the Principles 
forsakes that subjective movement and presents the objective results of those same 
Meditations. When Hegel situates the Cartesian philosophy in the history of philosophy, 
his interest is in the elements, and not in their subjective development, a development 
which in the course of the larger history is superceded. Spinoza also treats the Cartesian 
philosophy objectively, and he too uses the Principles as his text. The objective 
standpoint of the Principles or of Spinoza himself is only brought into view by working 
through the subjective standpoint of the Meditations. If for Descartes the causal argument 
for God's existence must come first in the "order of reasons", that is, subjectively, Hegel 
knows that in the logic of the history of philosophy, the "idea of God" is at that moment a 
presupposition, and in that idea is presupposed also the a priori proof.  
                                                
39 Hegel: the Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, Bloomington, Ind., 1984, 641.. 
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       But in truth the authority of the Meditations is not lost on Hegel. His discussions of 
doubt, of thinking, of the identity of thought and being in the cogito, of all the elements 
of the Cartesian philosophy are among the most profound reflections on the Meditations 
to have been written. Hegel is fully conversant with the philosophy of the Meditations, 
offers the deepest commentary on its elements and its originality, and could not from the 
Principles alone have come to such an appreciation of the Cartesian philosophy. 
Descartes is the true beginning of modern philosophy, a philosophy which begins with 
thought alone. That true beginning is found in the subjective reflections of the 
Meditations, not in the presentation of the Principles. This is manifestly not lost on 
Hegel.  
       Hegel virtually quotes from Rep. Obj. II40, and therefore would know Descartes' 
views on the merits of "analysis". Hegel's speculative method, the dialectical method, he 
describes as the end of the Logic: "The philosophical method is both analytic and 
synthetic, but not in the sense of a mere juxtaposing or a mere alternation of both these 
methods of finite cognition; instead, the philosophical method contains them sublated 
within itself, and therefore it behaves, in every one of its movements, analytically and 
synthetically at the same time. Philosophical thinking proceeds analytically in that it 
simply takes up its object, the Idea, and lets it go its own way, while it simply watches 
the movement and development of it, so to speak. To this extent philosophy is wholly 
passive. But philosophical thinking is equally synthetic as well, and it proves to be the 
activity of the Concept itself. But this requires the effort to beware of our own inventions 
and particular opinions which are forever wanting to push themselves forward." 
[Encyclopedia Logic, n. 238, Add.] His description of the "analytic method" is entirely 
appropriate to the Cartesian philosophy as he presents it in the Lectures. The method is 
the source of the "naiveté" he detects in Descartes and appreciates fully in his letter to 
Cousin.  
NOTES  
In accordance with current practice, I use the following abbreviations for 
the standard editions of Descartes and Hegel:  
AT  Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds. Oeuvres de Descartes, 12 vols., 
Paris, 1974. 
CB  John Cottingham, trans., Descartes' Conversation with Burman, 
Oxford, 1976.  
CSM  John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdock, The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I and II, Cambridge, 1985.  
CSMK  Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdock, Anthony Kenny, The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol III (The Correspondence), 
Cambridge, 1991.  
                                                
40 Michelet I, 1411, 1412 and passim; Brown, 140; Michelet II, 232, 233. 
